The ordinary Spartan was a warrior, trained to obey and endure; he became a politician only if chosen as ephor for a single year. He could be elected a life member of the council after his sixtieth year, in which he would be free from military service.

At the age of twenty, the Spartan began his military service and his membership in one of the syssitia (dining messes or clubs), composed of about fifteen members each, of which every citizen was required to be a member. The Spartan exercised the full rights and duties of a citizen at the age of thirty. Only native Spartans were considered full citizens, and needed to undergo the training as prescribed by law, and participation in and contribution to one of the dining-clubs. Those who fulfilled these conditions were considered “peers,” (homoioi) citizens in the fullest sense of the word, while those who failed were called “lesser men,” and retained only the civil rights of citizenship.

Spartans were absolutely debarred by law from trade or manufacture, which consequently rested in the hands of the perioeci, and were forbidden (in theory) to possess either gold or silver. Spartan currency consisted of bars of iron, thus making thievery and foreign commerce very difficult and discouraging the accumulation of riches. Wealth was, in theory at least, derived entirely from landed property, and consisted in the annual return made by the Helots, who cultivated the plots of ground allotted to the Spartans. But this attempt to equalize property proved a failure: from the earliest times, there were marked differences of wealth within the state, and these became even more serious after the law of Epitadeus, passed at some time after the Peloponnesian War, removed the legal prohibition of the gift or bequest of land. Helots were ruthlessly controlled, primarily through the secret police or Krypteia.

Full citizens, released from any economic activity, were given a piece of land (kleros), which was cultivated and run by the Helots. As time went on, greater portions of land were concentrated in the hands of large landholders, but the number of full citizens decreased over time. Citizens had numbered 8,000 at the beginning of the 5th century BC, but had decreased by Aristotle’s day (384-322BC) to less than 1,000, and had further decreased to 700 at the accession of Agis IV in 244 BC. Attempts were made to remedy this situation by creating new laws. Certain penalties were imposed upon those who remained unmarried or who married too late in life. These laws, however, came too late and were ineffective in reversing the trend.

Perhaps the most widely known event on the efficiency of the Spartan war-machine is related to the Persian Wars. The Spartan stand at the Battle of Thermopylae has been repeatedly cited in a military Grand Strategy context as a role model on the advantages of training, strategy and bravery against extremely overwhelming odds.

Imagine having a state in your country where every single male is trained in the ways of combat and military strategy since the age of 4. Now, imagine having its sovereign king lead your country’s army against an invading adversary… even if said adversary was ruler of most of the world at the time, you can’t deny there’s a sense of comfort in knowing that the king of a state full of war machines is leading you into battle. Greek forces were composed of Tegeans, Arcadians (remember “The Scorpion King?”), Corinthians, Thespians, Thebans, Mycenaeans, Floians and Mantineans; all of them providing anywhere between 200 to 1,000 troops to fend off the Persian army in the mountain pass of Thermopylae. Along with the Spartans, these states would compose the forces that would stop the Persians from invading Greece. 300 Spartan warriors came with Leonidas when it was time to make their stand.

The battle would seem at first glance like nothing but suicide: commanded by king Xerses I of Persia, his army was estimated to be of 1,700,000 in infantry alone. Fearing that Xerxes would unleash all of his army on them, this is why the mountain pass and Sparta’s military strategy was so important in the final outcome of the battle: A narrow path through the mountains where Xerxes’ armies would be caught in a funnel effect would greatly improve Greece’s chances of holding them back while their naval army prepared… it was greatly considered that the war could be won on sea, but they needed time. In many respects, modern conceptions assume that this battle was a suicide mission in regards of the Spartans. Even though they were vastly outnumbered, the Greek forces managed to fight off the Persian army… for 3 days straight.

3 days straight.

On the second day, Greek troops were the subject of treason when a local shepherded called Ephilates shifted loyalties to the Persians and told Xerxes of a separate path through Thermopylae which would put them right behind Greek lines and ambush them. The pass was being defended by 1,000 troops when the path was discovered right before the battle commenced but they were no match for the impending Persian sweep, making them retreat and leaving the path open for the enemy to continue. Realizing that fighting any more would result in annihilation he ordered all troops to stand back and flee; the Spartans, having sworn to fight to the death for their country, stayed. All 300 of them. Along with them, a band of 700 Thespians led by general Demophilus refused to leave, instead opting to join Leonidas and his troops for one last stand to allow the rest of the Greek army to escape and give time for the naval fleet to prepare for battle. The battle was brutal and unrelenting; one by one the Greeks would be slain and pushed back to the narrowest part of the mountain pass… now, the Spartans (and Thespians, for which after this battle swore an alliance to the Spartans that goes on to this day) never stopped fighting; it is said that after their spears eventually broke they kept fighting with their short swords… and after those broke, the kept fighting with their bare hands, teeth and nails. It wasn’t until the end of the battle was near that Leonidas was slain… rather than surrender though, the Spartans fought off the Persians in order to defend his body like a pack of manic lions. After losing two of his brothers as well as a ridiculously large amount of casualties, Xerxes ordered his archers to kill off the remaining Spartans with a flock of arrows. Every one of the 300 Spartans were killed while fighting; add to that the 700 or so casualties the Greek army sustained during the battle and you’ve got the grand total of 1,000 or so dead on the Greek side… take that into consideration as well as the 10,000 total of troops when the battle began and compare it to the estimated 200,000 troops that fought them and the 50,000 casualties they took once the battle was over. Apparently, over 20,000 of those Persian casualties might’ve taken place while the Spartans and Thespians made their last stand… that’s less than 1,000 troops, killing 20 times as many soldiers. This severely crippled the Persian army and would eventually meet their downfall in the Battle of Salamis.

Knowing the likely outcome of the battle, Leonidas selected his men on one simple criterion: he took only men who had fathered sons that were old enough to take over the family responsibilities of their fathers. The rationale behind this criterion was that the Spartans knew their death was almost certain at Thermopylae. Plutarch mentions, in his Sayings of Spartan Women, that after encouraging her husband before his departure for the battlefield, Gorgo, the wife of Leonidas I asked him what she should do when he had left. To this, Leonidas replied:

Marry a good man, and have good children.

When Xerxes reached Thermopylae, he sent emissaries to the Greek forces. At first he asked Leonidas to come on his side and offered him to be king of all of Greece. Leonidas answered:

If you knew what is good in life, you would abstain from wishing for foreign things. For me it is better to die for Greece than to be monarch over my compatriots (Plutarch, Moralia, 225, 10)

Then Xerxes asked him more forcefully to surrender their arms. To this Leonidas gave his very famous answer:

“Come take them”.

This quote has been repeated by many later generals, and even a few politicians, in order to express the Greeks’ determination to risk a huge sacrifice rather than surrender without a fight. It is today the emblem of the Greek First Army Corps.

Xerxes, angry at how a comparative handful of soldiers managed to annihilate so many of his soldiers, had Leonidas’ body retrieved only to have it decapitated and crucified despite the mutilation of a corpse, even if that of an enemy, being a big social stigma for the Persians. 40 years later the Spartan’s body was returned to Greece where a honorable funeral was celebrated and funeral games in his honor would take place every year.

The reason why I’m telling you all this is because people have the ability to overcome overwhelming odds and the Battle of Thermopylae is a testament to that, on that’s studied all across the globe in terms of a prime example in leadership, military strategy and most of all, perseverance and the will to fight. I became familiar with this particular story thanks to Frank Miller’s adaptation of the tale, called “300,” which is now being turned into a movie set to premiere next year. Be sure to check it out because not only is the story quite good but the movie looks downright mind-blowing. Here’s the Wikipedia entry that helped me out with this article if you’d like to know more, here’s info about Sparta and here’s the trailer to “300.”